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MAKE HIM AN OFFER HE CAN’T REFUSE: 
THE CONCERNING PRACTICE THAT 
EFFECTIVELY ENDS COLLECTIVE 
LITIGATION AND HOW TO FIX IT 
(WITHOUT THE SUPREME COURT) 
DANIEL FISHMAN* 
Abstract: In certain American jurisdictions, collective action lawsuits are se-
verely limited through rules that enable a defendant to make a settlement offer 
worth the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages and thus moot his or her claim, 
regardless of whether the offer is accepted. In collective litigation, if the set-
tlement offer is made prior to a motion for class certification, the defendant 
may end the litigation with minimal costs for the defendant, but with minimal 
justice for the represented class. This practice of mooting collective actions 
prior to a motion for class certification leaves the class without a representa-
tive, case, or settlement money, effectively ending collective litigation as an 
avenue of justice. Eliminating collective litigation takes an essential tool out 
of the hands of individuals seeking to enforce their rights against powerful 
and unified defendants in areas such as civil rights, environmental justice, and 
employment law. This Note advocates for either the U.S. Supreme Court to 
remedy this issue through its jurisprudence or for an amendment to the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent courts from mooting collective cases 
with unaccepted settlement offers prior to class certification, either through 
the traditional rulemaking process or through legislative action. 
INTRODUCTION 
Laura Symczyk worked as a nurse at the Pennypack Center (“Penny-
pack”), a medical and rehabilitative facility in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.1 
Pennypack automatically deducted one half hour’s worth of pay daily from 
Symczyk’s paycheck so that her meal break was unpaid, as statutorily per-
mitted.2 Pennypack, however, often made Symczyk work during her meal 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Comment Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 
2015–2016. 
 1 Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. (Genesis I), No. 09-5782, 2010 WL 2038676, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. May 19, 2010); Pennypack Center, GENESIS HEALTHCARE, http://www.genesishcc.com/
Pennypack [perma.cc/7T2C-NDR7]. 
 2 Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk (Genesis III), 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013); see Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012); KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LEGAL PRO-
TECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 393 (4th ed. 2011). 
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breaks, meaning she should have received compensation for this time, as is 
required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).3 Despite the fact that 
her employer did not contest that this practice of withholding pay violated 
her rights, the nature of litigation makes a legal remedy difficult and costly 
for Symczyk to pursue alone.4 
Symczyk was not the only one who had been wronged: Pennypack and 
its corporate relatives, Genesis Healthcare Corporation and Genesis Elder-
care (collectively “Genesis”), used the same unlawful system to automati-
cally deduct pay for working meal times from thousands of its employees.5 
In this situation, each wronged employee could have the same claim against 
his or her employer for the same unlawful practice.6 Fortunately for these 
workers, similarly situated parties may litigate a claim collectively as a 
class rather than individually, avoiding what would ordinarily be a cost-
prohibitive attempt at litigation for each individual employee.7 A collective 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 29 U.S.C. § 216; Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. The FLSA was passed to ensure a 
minimum standard that employers must pay employees “to provide for the basic costs of existence 
in an industrial society.” DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 327; see 29 U.S.C. § 216. An 
often-litigated aspect of the law is determining if time, such as meal breaks, at work is compensa-
ble under the statute. See DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 383–402; see, e.g., IBP v. Alva-
rez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); Pabst v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2000). The 
Wage and Hour Division’s (WHD) enforcement policies allow meal periods to be unpaid if the 
break lasts at least thirty minutes and the employee is free from “all work duties.” See DAU-
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 393. 
 4 See Genesis I, 2010 WL 2038676, at *1; DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 393, 418–
19. Although an employee’s rights under the FLSA can be enforced by the U.S. Secretary of La-
bor after an investigation by the WHD, an employee has the right to sue the violating employer for 
the wage violation. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 418–20. Employees have been doing so 
more frequently, primarily due to the recent reduction in WHD investigators as the result of budg-
etary issues. Id. Reasonable attorney fees and costs may be included in an action to recover back 
wages but, considering the modest amount of back pay that Symczyk allegedly was owed, these 
attorney fees likely would have been insignificant. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); Genesis I, 2010 
WL 2038676, at *1 (stating that Symczyk could have recovered $7500 in damages plus attorneys 
fees, but that the settlement offer was made the same day that the employer filed an answer to the 
complaint); DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 419. 
 5 See Complaint at 2–3, Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. (Genesis I), No. 09-5782, 2010 
WL 2038676, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2010). Employees may bring FLSA suits individually or by 
groups of similarly situated workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 419. 
 6 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Complaint, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 7 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The process for collective action under the FLSA is different from 
the process for a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but both allow for similar-
ly situated individuals to sue collectively. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (always requiring all plain-
tiffs to opt in and consent in writing to be a party), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (discussing various 
ways the court must give notice to absent class members but not always with written consent and 
allowing absent members to opt out). 
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lawsuit makes justice more accessible for these employees and is more effi-
cient for the court.8 
Symczyk filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all other FLSA-
covered employees whom Genesis subjected to the illegal automatic pay 
deductions.9 Simultaneous with its answer to the complaint, Genesis offered 
a settlement to only Symczyk, which would compensate her for her previ-
ously unpaid lunch breaks and any litigation costs she incurred.10 This offer 
would do nothing for the claims of the other wronged employees.11 Two 
weeks later, and without a response from Symczyk, Genesis withdrew its 
offer and moved to have the case dismissed for a lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. 12 Genesis argued that, because its offer would have provided 
Symczyk the complete relief sought in her suit, she now lacked a personal 
stake in the outcome, which rendered the action moot.13 Symczyk objected 
to Genesis’s motion, arguing that it was an attempt to “pick off” the named 
plaintiff before any class action began. 14 However, since no other class 
members had been able to join Symczyk as a plaintiff yet, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania rejected Symczyk’s objec-
tion, finding that Genesis’s offer fully satisfied her individual claim.15 Con-
sequently, the District Court concluded that the settlement offer mooted 
Symczyk’s claim.16 
With the claim mooted, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.17 After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the dismissal, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.18 U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas’s majority opinion assumed that the moot-
ing of Symczyk’s case was proper and held that, because she had no per-
sonal interest in representing the remaining class members, the case was 
properly dismissed.19 The Court accordingly reversed the Third Circuit rul-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS AC-
TIONS §§ 1:7–:10 (5th ed. 2014). 
 9 See Genesis I, 2010 WL 2038676, at *1. 
 10 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Genesis I, 2010 WL 2038676, at *1. 
 11 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Genesis I, 2010 WL 2038676, at *1. 
 12 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. No other class members had joined because Genesis simultaneously answered the com-
plaint and extended its offer. See id. Both events occurred before any conditional class certifica-
tion. Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. (Genesis II), 656 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d 
133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013). 
 16 Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Genesis I, 2010 WL 2038676, at *4. 
 17 Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 18 Id. at 1526–27. 
 19 See id. at 1529, 1532. 
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ing, thereby affirming the District Court ruling, and leaving Symczyk and 
the rest of the class without a case or settlement.20 
A defendant’s ability to moot representative plaintiffs’ cases with an 
unaccepted settlement offer before a class certification motion essentially 
erases the ability to litigate claims collectively. 21 Doing so incapacitates 
social justice movements led by civil rights groups and environmentalists, 
for instance, as well as groups of individuals seeking justice against large, 
well-financed opponents.22 Part I of this Note discusses collective litigation 
and its history, procedure, and policy, and the critical role it has played in 
achieving social justice. Part II examines the current split amongst the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeal. In addition, Part II analyzes the reasoning in favor 
of the majority rule of mooting proposed representative’s claims and the 
critical logical, policy, and social justice issues that arise. Part III recom-
mends multiple paths that rely on different branches of government to re-
solve this problem. Part III also considers both the Supreme Court’s ability 
and eagerness to remedy this issue through litigation as well as possible 
avenues to amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure using both the 
traditional rulemaking process and legislative action. 
I. COLLECTIVE LITIGATION AS A TOOL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE:  
HISTORY, PROCEDURE & POLICY 
Collective litigation has long played an important role in America’s le-
gal system, history, and society.23 When the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (the “Federal Rules”) were drafted, collective litigation procedures 
sought to advance several goals to benefit harmed plaintiffs who were una-
ble to bring individual claims: efficiency, compensation, deterrence, and 
legitimacy.24 Collective litigation has evolved into its current form primarily 
as a result of the changing legal atmosphere since the time the Federal 
Rules were written and the consequential shift in policy goals that the Fed-
eral Rules have sought to accomplish.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See id. at 1532. 
 21 See Weiss v. Regal Collection, 385 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Allowing the defendants 
here to ‘pick off’ a representative plaintiff with an offer of judgment less than two months after 
the complaint is filed may undercut the viability of the class action procedure  . . . .”). 
 22 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 242−44 (1987). 
 23 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:11–:16; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 267. 
 24 See Rules Advisory Committee’s Note to Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102−03 (1966); 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7−:10, 1:15. 
 25 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7–10, 1:15 (stating that the change to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 in 1966 “aimed to fulfill important policy objectives, including the channeling 
of common issues into a single lawsuit to ‘achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and 
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural 
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A. The History Behind Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
Collective litigation has a deep history in English common law dating 
back hundreds of years.26 Similar to the system in England, the American 
class action practice developed from the compulsory joinder rule in courts 
of equity.27 An attempt to institutionalize class actions in the 1938 version 
of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 23, however, proved diffi-
cult for courts to enforce.28 The rewriting of FRCP 23 in 1966 made class 
actions more practical for modern courts to apply in a manner that achieved 
the policy goals behind collective litigation.29 
The revision of FRCP 23 in 1966 reflects the critical social and politi-
cal atmosphere at the time.30 In fact, the drafters of the 1966 amendment 
considered various social movements when designing the rule.31 The most 
significant social justice force in class action evolution during this time was 
the civil rights movement.32 After politics failed to provide justice in the 
face of racial discrimination, civil rights leaders often turned to judicial 
remedies.33 The courts attracted opponents of racial discrimination because 
this discrimination directly opposed the individualism that the legal system 
claimed to protect.34 This strategy produced several legally significant vic-
                                                                                                                           
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results’”) (quoting Rules Advisory Committee’s Note 
to Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102−03 (1966)). 
 26 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 38 (discussing centuries of British collective actions in-
cluding a rector who sued parishioners in 1199 and collected a few individuals to testify on behalf 
of the whole group). 
 27 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:13 (citing THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS: THE 
LAW OF 50 STATES § 1.02[2]). In the old British courts of equity, this compulsory joinder rule 
required that “all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject matter 
of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or defendants, however numerous, so that 
there may be a complete decree which shall bind all.” DICKERSON, supra, § 1.02[1]. The rule for 
compulsory joinder has evolved but still remains in the American judicial system. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 19; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:13. 
 28 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:14. The rule included terms such as “joint” and “common” 
that were “obscure and uncertain” for courts trying to enforce this rule. Id. 
 29 Id. § 1:15. The Advisory Committee stated that the new rule: 
[D]escribes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions; pro-
vides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments in-
cluding those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not the 
judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to the measures which can be taken to 
assure the fair conduct of these actions. 
Id. (quoting Rules Advisory Committee’s Note to Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966)). 
 30 YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243, 245. 
 31 See id. at 245 (discussing how the structure of FRCP 23 “makes more sense if what the 
drafters had in mind were racial minorities on the one hand and diffusely organized interest groups 
on the other”). 
 32 See id. at 240. 
 33 See id. at 241. 
 34 Id. 
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tories, such as Brown v. Board of Education.35 But these victories fell short 
in their desired societal impact as national political candidates often did not 
prioritize civil rights.36 During the post-Brown period, courts showed impa-
tience with integration’s slow pace as desegregation suits poured into feder-
al court.37 
Additionally, the 1960s and 1970s saw other movements bidding for 
national attention.38 Many perceived the economy as operating with a short-
term perspective that sacrificed long-term values, such as environmental 
preservation.39 Specifically, several environmentalists sought to utilize judi-
cial tools—such as nuisance law—to protect resources like air and water; 
others advocated for preserving part of the vanishing wilderness.40 Overall, 
environmentalists attempted to prevent and fix the market failure that was 
caused by a small number of industries perpetuating environmental harm as 
a byproduct, while avoiding the repercussions of their actions.41 
Beyond environmentalism, many saw market failures in everyday 
products that could be fixed through the use of collective litigation.42 The 
free market during this time in history was not self-regulating due to insuf-
ficient information compounded by market distortions.43 Additionally, the 
political process proved to be ineffective in regulating industrial activity.44 
As a result, corporations could sell large quantities of makeshift products 
without fallout from the market or the political process.45 The hope was that 
collective action could give those wronged by defective products the same 
power that derives from the economies of scale as the manufacturer, show-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. (mentioning that Brown and Hansberry v. Lee were two cases in a “long series of 
lawsuits attacking segregated conditions”); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (a Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People lawsuit attacking racial discrimination 
in housing). In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that segregation in schools 
denied plaintiffs equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and that separate 
educational facilities based on race were inherently unequal. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 36 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 241–42. Presidents before 1964 often used “rhetorical 
gestures and occasional defensive moves” to placate civil rights-focused voters but failed to push 
for the sweeping changes that civil rights leaders desired. See id. at 242 (detailing measures by 
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy). 
 37 See id. at 243. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. at 244. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. These industries included energy and real estate development. Id. 
 42 See id. at 243. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Id. Yeazell cites to various environmental disasters as well as General Motors’ hiring of a 
private investigator to probe into Ralph Nader after his pro-consumer protection book was pub-
lished about the dangers of the car industry. Id. 
 45 See id. at 243−44. 
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ing that collective action was a “‘mass production remedy’ for ‘mass pro-
duction wrongs.’”46 
B. Collective Litigation Procedure 
The default structure of an American lawsuit is individual litigation.47 
Collective litigation is allowed, however, when a representative litigates the 
common claims of a class of individuals too numerous to join the case indi-
vidually.48 Class actions are representative suits on behalf of those who are 
absent and are similarly situated.49 Class actions are a form of collective 
litigation, but are not the only form, and many forms have their own indi-
vidual procedures.50 For the purposes of this Note, both terms are used and 
distinctions occasionally are made, but class actions will be the form of col-
lective litigation discussed herein because of their prevalence.51 However, 
the core issue of mooting cases with unaccepted settlement offers affects 
various forms of collective litigation.52 
In order for a case to move forward as a class action, a court must cer-
tify the class.53 This typically occurs when a plaintiff moves for class certi-
fication, a defendant moves for an order denying class certification, or a 
party files either a cross-motion in support of or in opposition to a class cer-
tification, depending on its position.54 These motions are adjudicated to de-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. 
 47 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3 (citing William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Ad-
dressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L. 
J. 1623, 1625 (1997)). 
 48 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Not all collective litigation is 
conducted via FRCP 23 class actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). Many statutory collective 
action vehicles have procedures similar to FRCP 23, with some occasional modifications. Com-
pare, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (requiring all plaintiffs who want to be a party to a suit to opt in by con-
senting in writing), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (discussing various ways the court must give notice 
to absent class members that often depends on the nature of the suit). 
 49 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 1:5. 
 50 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (permitting collective litigation for violations of the FLSA), 
with FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (prescribing methods for class litigation generally). 
 51 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:17. 
 52 Compare Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (mooting the claim of a proposed representative 
prior to a class certification motion in collective FLSA suit and dismissing entire claim), with Diaz 
v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 950−51 (9th Cir. 2013) (mooting claims of a 
proposed representative in a class action prior to a class certification motion and dismissing the 
entire suit in district court). 
 53 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. FRCP 23 lists class certification requirements in subsections (a) 
(prerequisites for class action) and (b) (acceptable types of class actions). See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a)−(b). 
 54 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 7:1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
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termine if the class meets the requirements for certification under FRCP 
23.55 
First, FRCP 23(a) requires that the class be so large that a joinder of 
each member would be impracticable. 56  It also requires that there be a 
common question of law or fact among all members of the class.57 Further, 
most important to the issue of mooting, the class must also have a repre-
sentative whose claims or defenses are typical of those of the class and who 
will adequately represent the interests of the class.58 Not satisfying any one 
of the requirements will result in the court denying the class certification 
motion.59 
In addition to the prerequisites of FRCP 23(a), a potential class action 
must fit into one of the acceptable categories prescribed in FRCP 23(b).60 
The most common category met falls under FRCP 23(b)(3) when the court 
determines that questions of law or fact common to members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that 
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.61 FRCP 23(b)(1)(A) exists for situations in 
which inconsistent adjudications could lead to incompatible standards for 
defendants.62 FRCP 23(b)(1)(B) establishes a mandatory class action when 
                                                                                                                           
 55 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 7:2. To determine class certification in 
federal courts, FRCP 23 applies to cases with federal subject matter jurisdiction both for a federal 
question and for those with diversity of citizenship because the rule is a procedural one rather than 
one affecting the substance or merits of the case. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 7:2. 
 56 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. This requirement is often re-
ferred to as numerosity. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. 
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. This requirement is often re-
ferred to as commonality. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. 
 58 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. These requirements are often re-
ferred to as typicality and adequacy, respectively. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. 
 59 See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). A “class action . . . may only be 
certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied.” Id.; see RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:2. All the requirements of FRCP 23(a) 
must be met before a class action is certified. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:1. A class certifica-
tion motion should be made at an “early practicable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(a). Any party can 
initiate a class certification motion. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 7:1. This critical determination on a 
class certification motion often occurs before any dispositive motion on a suit’s merits. See RU-
BENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 7:8. The declining certification rate from around thirty-seven percent in 
1996 to fewer than twenty percent by 2014 is its own social justice problem worthy of research and 
solutions, as certification greatly affects a class’s ability to recover. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, 
§ 1:18. 
 60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. 
 61 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. This category is often used 
for class actions when each class member demands a small amount of money as recovery. See 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. 
 62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. The Advisory Committee 
imagined that this rule would be used for “[s]eparate actions by individuals against a municipality to 
declare a bond issue invalid or condition or limit it, to prevent or limit the making of a particular 
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litigating rights in an individual manner would essentially eliminate claims 
of potential members.63 FRCP 23(b)(2) allows for class actions when a par-
ty, likely a defendant, has taken or refused to take action with respect to the 
class, and the final judgment will be or at least will include equitable re-
lief.64 
The nature of class actions as representative suits on behalf of others 
similarly situated requires that absent, unnamed class members have specif-
ic rights and duties.65 The absent class members have a nontraditional status 
in litigation because they are treated like parties for some purposes but not 
others.66 Most importantly, the result of collective action is binding on ab-
sent class members unless they specifically opt out of the class action.67 
C. Policy Benefits of Collective Litigation 
There are four main policy benefits achieved through collective litiga-
tion: efficiency, compensation, deterrence, and legitimacy.68 These goals are 
reflected in the rules governing collective action.69 
                                                                                                                           
appropriation or to compel or invalidate an assessment, might create a risk of inconsistent or varying 
determinations.” See Rules Advisory Committee’s Note to Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 
(1966). This category is “somewhat opaque and rarely utilized.” See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, 
§ 1:3. 
 63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 1:3. This category is often 
referred to as a “limited fund” class action because the defendant has limited funds, making it 
incapable of satisfying all potential claimants. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 1:3. The rule pro-
motes fairness in this situation by giving each member a pro rata share of the recovery. See id. 
 64 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. Actions utilizing this rule 
are often referred to as “civil rights” or “injunctive” class suits. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, 
§ 1:3. 
 65 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:5. 
 66 See id. For example, in deciding whether a case has diversity jurisdiction, the court only 
considers the citizenship of the class representative. Id. The amount in controversy requirement, 
however, must be met by each class member in order to achieve diversity jurisdiction. Id. Addi-
tionally, absent class members are not required to appear before the court, are rarely subjected to 
counterclaims or cross-claims, and are only involved in discovery as third-party witnesses, rather 
than as a party. Id. 
 67 Id. § 1:6. The default rule for FRCP 23 class actions is an opt-out provision, but some col-
lective action processes, such as collective actions enforcing FLSA violations, require class mem-
bers to opt in. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); Genesis III 133 S. Ct. at 1529. 
 68 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7−10. 
 69 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Rules Advisory Committee’s Note to 
Amended Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102−03 (1966) (stating the policy that class actions would 
achieve “economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision” for the 
class); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:3, 1:7−10. For example, the specific categories of quali-
fied classes for classification represent these intentions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). FRCP 23(b)(1) 
prevents defendants from being subjected to two conflicting court orders, helping with legitimacy. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. This rule also benefits all plaintiffs in 
the certified class; it ensures that if a defendant has limited resources, all plaintiffs can benefit 
from these resources, as opposed to leaving late plaintiffs empty-handed after early plaintiffs have 
had their claims fully paid, helping with both compensation and efficiency. RUBENSTEIN, supra 
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First, collective litigation promotes administrative efficiency by ena-
bling claims to be processed through a representative, thus avoiding multi-
ple identical actions. 70  Reducing identical actions saves the court’s re-
sources.71 The named plaintiff can share the costs of litigation with his or 
her fellow class members.72 These absent class members reap the benefits 
of the litigation without having to be actively involved.73 Moreover, addi-
tional efficiency benefits emerge because collective litigation eliminates the 
risk of inconsistent results that may occur when similarly situated individu-
als bring identical claims against the same defendant.74 Inconsistent results 
send confusing signals to potential plaintiffs looking to bring litigation and 
defendants hoping to comply with the law.75 
From an economic perspective, collective actions permit plaintiffs “to 
pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”76 Col-
lective litigation, therefore, enables justice for individuals who have no 
practical means of compensation via individual litigation for small harms 
because the cost of the lawsuit would outweigh any individual recovery.77 
Collective litigation, ranging from consumer protection to employee rights, 
                                                                                                                           
note 8, § 1:3. Other collective procedures, such as those governing FLSA collective action, also 
reflect these various goals, such as helping protect absent class members by requiring written 
consent before binding them to the result of the litigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 70 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9 (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 
454, 466 n.12 (1975) (acknowledging “the purposes of litigatory efficiency served by class ac-
tions”)); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974) (describing “efficiency and 
economy of litigation” as “a principal purpose of the [class action] procedure”). FRCP 23 is “de-
signed to further procedural fairness and efficiency.” RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9 (quoting 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 402 (2010)). 
 71 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. When similarly situated individuals have claims large 
enough that each would pursue these claims individually, collective litigation prevents the court 
from potentially having to manage a flood of identical, individual cases. Id. 
 72 Id. Evidence shows that collective litigation reduces fees and costs for both the plaintiff and 
the court, and assuming each class member files an individual action, potentially for the defend-
ants as well. Id. 
 73 Id. Because a class representative stands in for them, class members are spared the time and 
energy of pursuing their own individual litigation. Id. Simply put: “An absent class action plaintiff 
is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course.” Id. 
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985)). 
 74 See id. § 1:9. 
 75 Id. Class actions add an increased level of efficiency in cases litigated under FRCP 23(b)(3) 
because the required notice allows all class members to know about proposed relief and makes 
that relief available to those who want it, providing consistency for both plaintiffs and defendants 
alike. See id. Similar benefits are available to other collective action vehicles that include opt-in 
provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 76 See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809. 
 77 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:7 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 
161 (1974) (noting that petitioner’s individual potential award was only seventy dollars and that, 
accordingly, “[n]o competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so 
inconsequential an amount,” but, instead, “[e]conomic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed 
as a class action or not at all”)). 
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shows this principle in effect: even when each individual plaintiff’s damag-
es are minimal, litigation will continue to be vigorously pursued as it winds 
through several levels of appeals.78 
Additionally, collective litigation deters misconduct that occurs when 
no individual actor has the financial incentive to sue.79 By allowing collec-
tive suits that include multiple small claims, bad actors are exposed to lia-
bility, which deters their future misdeeds.80 If plaintiffs were required to 
bring claims individually, bad actors would not be forced to pay for their 
misdeeds, as few plaintiffs would sue. 81  In this way, the compensation 
awarded following class actions to those wronged “provide[s] an important 
private supplement to public enforcement of social norms.”82 
Even for laws that charge public agencies with enforcement, effective 
compliance nationwide usually requires private litigation, often litigated 
collectively.83 Consequently, several statutes aimed at promoting broad so-
cietal changes often depend on private litigation to enforce these important 
rights. 84  By forcing defeated defendants to pay for plaintiff’s attorney’s 
fees, class action enlists private attorneys to enforce rights that the govern-
ment often cannot prosecute, further deterring more bad acts.85 This creates 
an incentive for private attorneys to pursue small claims for groups of peo-
ple.86 In many ways, private attorneys enforce these major laws as so-called 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (reviewing suit concerning employer’s failure to pay 
thirty minutes’ worth of FLSA-required pay daily where the named plaintiff’s unpaid wages were 
worth $7500 total); Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809 (reviewing suit over gas company’s fail-
ure to pay investors proper royalties where the value of each claim was worth $100); Eisen, 417 
U.S. at 161 (reviewing suit where each individual’s damages were only $70, implying that recov-
ery was only available in collective litigation). 
 79 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. This includes various employment and civil rights statutes. See id. “When the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the 
Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance 
with the law.” Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968)). 
 84 See Newman, 390 U.S. at 401 (discussing how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relies on pri-
vate litigation to “secur[e] broad compliance with the law”); DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 419 (discussing how employees’ rights under the FLSA can be enforced by the Secretary of 
Labor after an investigation by the Wage and Hour Division, but more often than not are enforced 
by the employee himself or herself). 
 85 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 86 Id. This private enforcement may also be superior in some ways to public enforcement 
because of increased efficiency and less political constraint and motivation. See id. (citing Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 
191; Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Ruben, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 
167, 168–69 (1985)). The sheer increase of enforcers, both public and private, allows for innova-
tion and more protective litigation. Id. (citing Thompson, supra, at 206). 
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“private Attorney[s] General[].”87 This army of plaintiffs’ attorneys, acting 
as private attorneys general by enforcing society-altering statutes, deter bad 
acts by ensuring that defendants have to pay for the damage they cause as 
well as for the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.88 This deterrence of bad acts in-
creases the overall efficiency of class actions because litigation relating to 
future acts is generally eliminated.89 
The use of collective litigation strengthens the legitimacy of the legal 
system by preventing inconsistent opinions and protecting the interests of 
absent class members.90 Although discrepancies between the elements of 
different cases, such as evidence or lawyering styles, may explain some in-
consistent results for similar plaintiffs with similar claims, skepticism of the 
legal system resulting from inconsistent results dissipates when plaintiffs 
litigate together in a collective litigation.91 Resolving numerous legal and 
factual issues for many different parties in one proceeding assures the con-
sistent resolution of claims. 92  Additionally, class actions litigated under 
FRCP 23(b)(3) require notice to all class members of the proposed relief, 
making the relief equally available to the whole group.93 The desire to avoid 
inconsistent results is so strong that, in some special circumstances where 
inconsistency is particularly problematic, FRCP 23 allows for mandatory 
classes to protect against the possibility of inconsistent results.94 Collective 
litigation and its protections for absent class members aid the legitimacy of 
the legal system: for class actions, these protections include adequate repre-
sentation, notice, and an opportunity to opt out of the class.95 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Associated Indus. of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacat-
ed, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); see also Darren Carter, Note, Notice and the Protection of Class Mem-
bers’ Interests, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996). The role of private attorneys general is not 
without its critics, but these attorneys often get recovery for their clients. See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not 
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 215–19 (1983). 
 88 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 89 See id. § 1:9 (“The deterrent effect of the small-claims class action preserves public en-
forcement and judicial resources as it obviates the need for future enforcement proceedings.”). 
 90 See id. § 1:10. 
 91 See id. (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 390 (D. Mass. 1979) (“A fundamental 
aspect of justice is parity of treatment. Persons similarly situated and aggrieved should be similar-
ly treated.”), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983)). 
 92 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. 
 93 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. 
 94 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A); see RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. 
 95 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. Other protections mentioned include: 
[R]equiring court appointment and supervision of class counsel to ensure that they 
fairly and adequately represent class interests; court approval of any settlement, vol-
untary dismissal, or compromise relating to a claim, issue, or defense of a certified 
class; notice and an opportunity to object regarding a request for an award of attor-
neys’ fees and nontaxable costs; and court findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding a request for attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs. The court also has 
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D. Collective Litigation’s Critical Role in Achieving Social Justice 
In recent decades, collective litigation has enabled significant social 
justice victories.96 As Professor Stephen C. Yeazell explained, groups that 
have “occupied the fringes of social acceptance” often use collective litiga-
tion to bring about justice and social change.97 Collective action “bring[s] 
otherwise powerless individuals together as a group [and] gives the class 
formidable strength, forcing state officials as well as corporate boardrooms 
to recognize the rights of the class when, on an individual level, such rights 
would likely be ignored.”98 
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court and Congress have 
repeatedly created additional hurdles to successful class actions.99 Despite 
these obstacles, collective action remains a strong avenue for many advoca-
cy groups fighting for justice.100 Groups utilizing collective action range 
from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) and environmental groups, and the social 
wrongs their efforts have sought to correct run the gamut from racial dis-
                                                                                                                           
broad discretionary powers to assist in its supervision of the representative litigation 
including the ability to require appropriate notice to the class for various reasons 
throughout the course of the litigation and the ability to impose conditions on the 
representative parties or intervenors. Finally, the court has authority to alter or 
amend the class certification order at any time before final judgment. 
Id. Other types of collective action litigation include stronger protections for absent class mem-
bers. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 96 See, e.g., Nicholas W. Edwards, Case Comment, Class Action Public Nuisance: Cleve-
land’s Real Chance at Taking on Subprime Lenders, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 334 (2013) 
(discussing the use of class action litigation to take on subprime lenders who helped cause the 
recent financial crisis); Krista Kauble, Case Comment, Litigating Keyes: The New Opportunity for 
Litigators to Achieve Desegregation, 31 CHICANA/O–LATINA/O L. REV. 103, 111–12 (2012) (stat-
ing that collective action litigation has greatly shaped public education in America over the past 
few decades); YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 267 (commenting on how collective litigation has 
helped “marginal social groups” achieve progress in areas such as civil rights). 
 97 YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 267 (remarking that historical uses of group litigation, from 
villages to civil rights organizations, have “not always implied high social status”). 
 98 Carter, supra note 87, at 1121. Often, plaintiffs’ attorneys leading the charge as private 
attorneys general ensure that rights are protected. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS AC-
TION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 71–72 (2000). These rights are 
enforced using various forms of collective action. See id. (discussing plaintiffs’ attorneys using 
class actions to enforce rights); see also Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (using a collective action 
to enforce the FLSA). 
 99 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178 (requiring plaintiffs to pay for notice to absent class members); 
Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. 511, 525–29 (2013) (detailing several congressional efforts to undermine collec-
tive litigation by restricting where certain kinds of class actions could be litigated and enabling 
defendants to remove away from “hellhole state courts” to federal court). 
 100 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 98, at 71–72. 
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crimination and segregation to fracking.101 These groups are often able to 
avoid certain costs associated with collective litigation by demanding equi-
table relief, such as procedural changes or injunctions, in addition to mone-
tary damages.102 Thus, these practices help fulfill the aforementioned policy 
goals of class actions.103 For example, Cogdell v. Wet Seal, a race-based 
employment discrimination class action brought and settled by the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, ensured compensation for harmed plaintiffs, deterred 
future discrimination, and attained equal and efficient justice for all those 
wronged without requiring each class member to bring suit individually.104 
Beyond major, mainstream advocacy groups, collective action remains 
a significant tool for groups of individuals seeking justice against large, 
well-financed opponents.105 Similar to civil rights organizations during the 
1960s and 1970s, victims of abuses at the hands of a large, unified corpora-
tion often lack the organizational power to effectively advocate for the recti-
fication of harms they have suffered.106 Class actions in these situations 
provide recoveries for plaintiffs and eliminate a large corporation’s financial 
incentive to externalize costs, such as the cost of making a safer or more 
environmentally friendly product. 107  Allowing this externalization would 
encourage corporations to spread small amounts of damages among large 
groups of people.108 The only rational way to ensure compensation for indi-
                                                                                                                           
 101 See id.; Press Release, Cmty. Envtl. Legal Def. Fund, Lafayette, Colorado, Residents File 
Class Action Lawsuit Against State, Governor, and Colorado Oil and Gas Association: Asks Court 
to Overturn State Oil and Gas Act and Dismiss Industry Lawsuit Against Lafayette (Jun. 10, 2014) 
(on file with author); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, NAACP Ask Court 
to Approve “DWB” Class Action Lawsuit Against Maryland State Police (Mar. 8, 2000), https://
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-naacp-ask-court-approve-dwb-class-action-lawsuit-against-maryland-state-
police [perma.cc/58D8-RE65]. 
 102 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 246–47. By demanding both monetary and equitable re-
lief, these advocacy groups frequently benefit from FRCP 23(b)(2), which does not require plain-
tiffs to pay for notice to be sent to all absent class members. See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
FRCP 23(b)(2) was so often utilized by civil rights advocates that it was often referred to as the 
civil rights class action rule. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3. 
 103 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7–10. 
 104 See Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation, Cogdell v. Wet Seal, No. SACV 12-
01138 (ANX) (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2013); Patrick Dorrian, Clothier Wet Seal Agrees to Pay $7.5 
Million to Settle Black Managers’ Class Bias Claims, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 13, 2013), http://
www.bna.com/clothier-wet-seal-agrees-to-pay-7-5-million-to-settle-black-managers-class-bias-
claims [perma.cc/H5XN-ZT79] (reporting settlement in response to suit filed by the NAACP 
against an employer whose executive tried to get rid of African-American employees and hire 
more white employees for the sake of “brand management”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 
§§ 1:7–10 (stating that the goals of collective litigation are efficiency, compensation, deterrence, 
and legitimacy). 
 105 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243 (explaining class ac-
tion as a tool to help individuals counterbalance industry’s economy of scale). 
 106 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243. 
 107 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243–44. 
 108 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243. 
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viduals who have suffered mass-produced harm is a mass-produced remedy 
through collective action.109 Even when governmental oversight or litiga-
tion is impractical or politically undesirable, aggrieved parties can still have 
their rights enforced through collective litigation while being represented by 
a “private attorney general.”110 
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST THE UNILATERAL  
MOOTING OF COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 
Collective litigation may serve as the vehicle for efficient relief when 
an individual actor harms many.111 Often, when the individual damages are 
minor yet a number of people are affected, the only way a defendant is 
forced to pay for its misdeeds is through collective litigation.112 Collective 
litigation efforts to restore justice for wronged plaintiffs are undercut when 
a defendant is able to moot the claim.113 
In some circuits, courts allow defendants to effectively dodge collec-
tive litigation and the payment of any resulting monetary damages before 
the class is certified by allowing the defendants to offer the class representa-
tive a settlement that completely satisfies his or her individual claim.114 Re-
gardless of whether the individual accepts the settlement offer, the court 
may enter judgment for the plaintiff and dismiss the individual claim be-
cause the individual no longer has a personal interest in the outcome of the 
action, making the claim moot.115 The case is then over before a ruling on 
class certification.116 
Although the defendant may have to pay the individual claim, this ma-
neuver forces the class to find another representative before the remaining 
members can recover.117 Even if another representative brings a case, the 
defendant is able to offer an individual settlement again, thus repeating the 
cycle.118 This leaves class members with the doomed choice between either 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809 (plaintiffs suing gas company based on failure 
to pay investors proper royalties when the value of each claim was worth $100); RUBENSTEIN, 
supra note 8, § 1:8; YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 243–44. 
 110 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 98, at 71–72. 
 111 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:7. 
 112 See id. (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)). 
 113 See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk (Genesis III), 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1536–37 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 114 See id. at 1533. A request for monetary damages is a unique component. See RUBENSTEIN, 
supra note 8, § 2:12. If plaintiffs in a case request equitable relief only, they will be able to avoid 
possible motions to moot the case by the defendants. See id. 
 115 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 116 See id. at 1536–37. 
 117 See id.; see also O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“An offer of judgment that satisfies a plaintiff’s entire demand moots the case.”). 
 118 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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bringing a case individually or forgoing any sort of recovery.119 Circuits are 
split on the issue, but, regrettably, the majority follows the practice of moot-
ing a claim with an unaccepted offer before a class certification motion is 
made, with only the proposed representative receiving compensation. 120 
Even more problematic, some circuits do not enter judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff with no claim and not even the monetary set-
tlement that the defendant was willing to pay.121 
The application of the mootness doctrine to unaccepted settlement of-
fers in pre-class certification collective litigation goes against logic, con-
flicts with the necessary policy benefits of collective litigation in our mod-
ern court system, and undermines any future social justice goals that could 
be achieved through collective litigation.122 
A. Reasoning in Favor of Mooting a Case Prior to Class Certification 
Circuits in favor of mooting claims prior to a class certification motion 
root their reasoning in the U.S. Constitution.123 Article III of the Constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 119 See Weiss v. Regal Collection, 385 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 120 See Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The 
majority of courts and commentators appear to agree with the Seventh Circuit that an unaccepted 
offer will moot a plaintiff’s claim.”) (citing to decisions from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits). The motion for class certification is critically important because the Supreme 
Court gradually developed the broad rule that once an order granting or denying class certification 
has issued, a class action will not be mooted even if the class representative’s claim becomes 
moot. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:10 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
388, 404 (1980)). 
 121 Compare Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Once the defendant 
offers to satisfy the plaintiff’s entire demand, there is no dispute over which to litigate, and a 
plaintiff who refuses to acknowledge this loses outright.”), overruled by Chapman v. First Index, 
Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015), with O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 574–75 (“The better approach is to 
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants’ Rule 68 offer.”). 
 122 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527–33, 
1535 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the logical flaws with mooting the proposed class repre-
sentative’s claim); Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (mooting claims and undermining the policy objectives 
of collective litigation); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 390 (D. Mass. 1979) (noting the 
importance of “parity of treatment” for the class aggrieved), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 
1983); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at §§ 1:7–10; ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES: THE TRIAL COURTS 1 (2013) (describing the slow pace of con-
firming federal judges in trial courts); ANDREW BLOTKY & SANDHYA BATHIJA, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES 1 (2013) (labeling the lack of federal trial court 
judges as “a crisis”); CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATEMENT ON 2012 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4–10 (2012), http://www.
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2012year-endreport.pdf [perma.cc/DQ7W-2VYZ] (detail-
ing the smaller budgets and larger caseloads of the modern federal court). 
 123 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal jurisdiction to “cases and controver-
sies”); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 574; Weiss, 385 F.3d at 340; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at § 2:9. 
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tion limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases and controversies.”124 
When the issues are no longer live or the parties do not have a legally rec-
ognizable interest in the outcome, the case, whether individual or collective, 
becomes moot because the plaintiff lacks standing and thus the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.125 
Standing in federal courts requires the plaintiff to present an Article III 
case or controversy.126 This constitutional limitation forces federal courts to 
only “adjudicat[e] actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which 
have direct consequences on the parties involved.”127 An offer of complete 
relief can moot a claim because, at the point of an offer, the plaintiff loses 
his or her personal interest in the outcome because accepting the offer is the 
same as completely winning the case.128 If a plaintiff lacks personal interest, 
a case cannot continue.129 Thus, proponents of the mootness doctrine see it 
as an important tool for ensuring federal courts do not reach beyond their 
constitutional role.130 
The mootness doctrine becomes more complicated when considering a 
representative’s continuation of litigation after his or her individual claim 
has become moot.131 If the class representative has his or her claim mooted 
yet desires to keep litigating, he or she is litigating another person’s 
claim.132 Courts often allow a mooted class representative to continue the 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Weiss, 285 F.3d at 340 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 94 (1968)). Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution reads: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public minis-
ters and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or 
more states;—between a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of 
different states;—between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of 
different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citi-
zens or subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 125 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1528; Weiss, 285 F.3d at 340 (citing Cnty. of Los Angeles v. 
Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9. 
 126 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 127 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1528. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9. Mootness results from Article III jurisdictional limits for 
federal courts but can be invoked in state courts for prudential, rather than constitutional, reasons. 
See id. (“Mootness in these states [without state constitutional justiciability clauses] is simply a 
principle of judicial restraint without any constitutional jurisdictional underpinnings.”) (quoting 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1861 (2001)). 
 131 See id. 
 132 Id. 
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litigation because the case and controversy requirement is satisfied by the 
relationship between the class and the defendant.133 The high bar of the pro-
cedural requirements that must be met for acceptance as the class repre-
sentative qualifies the representative as having a sufficiently personal stake 
for Article III purposes, and he or she must pursue the class’s claim as vig-
orously as his or her own individually.134 
This complication arises because courts hesitate to apply mootness 
rules strictly in the class context.135 Even if a representative’s claims are 
mooted, he or she still has the incentive to continue litigation vigorously to 
spread the costs of litigation to other members of the class.136 Courts are 
sometimes reluctant to strictly apply the mootness doctrine in a collective 
litigation context because defendants could frustrate class certification 
simply by offering complete recovery, mooting the class representative’s 
claim, and ending the entire litigation without any remedy for the rest of the 
class.137 
To ensure the legitimacy and availability of collective action, courts 
created exceptions to the mootness doctrine for collective situations. 138 
Most importantly for this context are the exceptions relating to class certifi-
cation.139 Once a district court has ruled on a class certification motion, the 
mooting of a class representative’s claim usually will not moot the class 
action.140 The Supreme Court has clearly said that even the denial of class 
certification will not allow the mooting of the representative’s claim to 
moot the entire class’s case.141 The mooted class representative may still 
appeal the denial of class certification because the Federal Rules of Civil 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 755–56 (1976) (ruling that 
the controversy was satisfied between the certified class and the defendant)). 
 134 See U.S. CONST. art. III; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (“[T]he representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9 (citing 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 (holding that the plaintiff must satisfy the personal stake requirement of 
FRCP 23(a)(4), which is a higher threshold than Article III of the Constitution). 
 135 See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that “the Supreme Court has applied the mootness doctrine less strictly in the class action con-
text”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9. 
 136 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See id. Other exceptions exist for specific substantive claims that occur in collective litiga-
tion, such as inherently transitory claims. See id. § 2:12. Additional exceptions include claims for 
just injunctive relief or mootness due to voluntary cessation of illegal conduct where there is no 
reasonable expectation that the harm will be repeated. See id. These exceptions are important but 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 140 See id. § 2:10 (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404). 
 141 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 388. 
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Procedure (“Federal Rules”) give the proposed representative the right to 
have the class certified if the specific rule’s requirements are met.142 
Proponents of mooting collective actions before class certification dif-
ferentiate pre-certification mooting from the other mootness exceptions.143 
This is because absent class members acquire a separate legal interest only 
when a class certification motion has been made, regardless of the court’s 
response to such a motion.144 An offer made prior to a class certification 
motion is aimed at just the individual proposed class representative when no 
separate interest for the class exists; therefore, proponents argue that when 
the representative’s claim is mooted, no other live claim exists.145 
B. Logical Problems with Mooting a Case Prior to Class Certification 
Allowing a defendant to moot a class representative’s claim prior to 
class certification is problematic at best.146 Most circuits have determined 
that if the proposed class representative’s case has been mooted before a 
class certification motion has been made, then the court must dismiss the 
case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, at that point, it is essen-
tially an individual case that has been mooted.147 
In addition to inappropriately conflating the important differences be-
tween collective and individual litigation, this approach of mooting collec-
tive litigation cases prior to class certification effectively ends a proposed 
class representative’s claim, regardless of whether a motion for class certifi-
                                                                                                                           
 142 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:10 (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402). The Court men-
tions that applying the “personal stake” analysis is difficult for a procedural motion. See Geraghty, 
445 U.S. at 422. The Court resolves this by calling it a “false dilemma” because class certification 
issues are “ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.” See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 422 (quot-
ing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)). 
 143 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See Roper, 445 U.S. at 340 n.12 (“Difficult questions arise as to what, if any, are the 
named plaintiffs’ responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra 
note 8, § 2:11 (“The problematic area concerns class claims that are live when filed but moot be-
fore adjudication of the class certification motion.”). 
 147 See Diaz, 732 F.3d at 952−53 (discussing different approaches taken by circuits after de-
termining the proposed representative’s claim is moot); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 575 (entering judg-
ment for plaintiff who received offer for complete recovery); Rand, 926 F.2d at 598 (stating that a 
plaintiff who refused to accept complete recovery “loses outright”). Once the offer for complete 
recovery has been made, district courts within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction enter judgment for the plaintiff. See O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 574−75. (“[T]he better ap-
proach is to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants’ Rule 68 
offer of judgment.”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has responded 
to a plaintiff’s rejection of an offer for complete recovery by dismissing the case for lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction. See Rand, 926 F.2d at 598. 
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cation had been made.148 The differentiation based on whether the settle-
ment offer occurs before or after a class certification motion has been made 
overlooks the fact that litigation filed in a collective nature is inherently 
designed to include more than the proposed representative’s claim.149 
Under the mootness doctrine, a court has discretion to end a lawsuit 
“when the defendant unconditionally surrenders and only the plaintiff’s ob-
stinacy or madness prevents her from accepting total victory.”150 For a case 
to be moot, the mooted party must have no concrete interest at all in the 
litigation.151 An unaccepted offer to settle a claim, however, is equivalent to 
the offer never existing in the first place.152 “Merely receiving an offer does 
not moot any claim.”153 
Moreover, the choice to bring a case collectively rather than individu-
ally shows that the proposed representative has an interest in his or her fel-
low class members’ cases.154 If nothing else, bringing the case collectively 
will reduce fees and costs for all members of the class.155 The suit will be a 
stronger deterrent as more plaintiffs and higher damages will prevent repeat 
behavior.156 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1533−35 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (detailing the various prob-
lems with this approach). 
 149 See id. at 1535; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 393 (1975) (explaining that the test for 
whether a mooted FRCP 23 class action representative could pursue a class’s claim was whether 
he could “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” irrespective of when the offer 
was made). 
 150 Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 1533. (“As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the out-
come of the litigation, the case is not moot.”) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 
(2012)). 
 152 See id. at 1533–34 (“An unaccepted settlement offer—like any unaccepted contract of-
fer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect. As every first-year law student learns, the recipi-
ent’s rejection of an offer ‘leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made’. . . assuming the 
case was live before—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief—the litiga-
tion carries on, unmooted.”) (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 
119 U.S. 149, 151 (1886)). 
 153 Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1535 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 154 See Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. (Genesis I), No. 09-5782, 2010 WL 2038676, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2010); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7, 1:9−10. 
 155 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. 
STUDIES 27, 64 (2004)). 
 156 See id. § 1:8. Allowing collective litigation is especially important for deterring questiona-
ble employment practices. See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (plaintiff bringing collective FLSA 
action against her employer on behalf of her and her co-workers); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, 
§ 1:18 (stating labor and employment cases are among the most frequent type of class action). 
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Consider that collective action litigation requires specific procedural 
protections to ensure adequate representation.157 This is because collective 
litigation is essentially representative litigation through which a proposed 
representative litigates on behalf of absent, similarly situated members.158 
The absent class members are bound by the outcome of the representative’s 
litigation notwithstanding its favorability.159 This form of vicarious repre-
sentation is only allowed because of the procedural rules in collective litiga-
tion that protect absent class members.160 
Logic accordingly follows that an action on behalf of a class does not 
become moot even after the representative’s claim has been mooted.161 This 
is true even if a lower court denies class certification.162 If the representa-
tive overcomes the procedural obstacles, the timing of the class certification 
motion should be irrelevant.163 As long as the proposed representative still 
wants to represent the class and can adequately do so, an unaccepted offer 
for complete recovery for only the class representative should not terminate 
the case.164 
C. Policy Ramifications of Mooting Cases Prior to Class Certification 
Mooting a proposed representative’s claim undercuts the policy bene-
fits that collective litigation achieves: efficiency, compensation, deterrence, 
and legitimacy.165 These benefits are virtually non-existent if a proposed 
representative’s claims are mooted following a settlement offer. 166 Even 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (requiring written consent of absent class members for 
FLSA actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring adequate representation of the class); RU-
BENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:1. 
 158 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:1. 
 159 See id. (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921)). The deci-
sion explains: 
Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and liabilities are 
so subject to change and fluctuation by death or otherwise, that it would not be pos-
sible, without very great inconvenience, to make all of them parties, and would of-
tentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For convenience, therefore, 
and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in 
interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if 
all were before the court. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. at 363 (quoting Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 301, 16 How. 288 (1853)). 
 160 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (ensuring the same result for all members of the 
class action); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:1. 
 161 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 2:9 (“Concluding that if a class action is moot once the 
representatives’ claims become moot this would present conceptual difficulties.”). 
 162 See id. § 2:10 (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 388, 404). 
 163 See id. §§ 2:9–:10. 
 164 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 165 See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7–10. 
 166 See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7–10. 
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some circuits in favor of mooting class representative’s claims recognize the 
danger of this practice.167 
The benefits of collective litigation are especially needed in today’s 
over-burdened, underfunded courts.168 The highly publicized and significant 
level of debt in the federal government has caused the federal government, 
including the judiciary, to focus on maximizing efficiency and reducing 
costs, creating additional stress for the nation’s court systems.169 
Unfortunately, the slow pace of nominating and confirming judges has 
exacerbated the current strain on federal courts. 170 In 2013, 170 million 
Americans lived in a jurisdiction in which the court system declared a judi-
cial emergency.171 Much of the media attention focused on the vacancies in 
appellate courts, but the trial courts, which resolve the vast majority of fed-
eral cases, are also in crisis.172 A shortfall in judicial resources, including a 
decrease in judges, leads to delay or denial of justice for those looking to 
the court for help.173 This delay is incredibly harmful for groups seeking 
well-deserved judicial relief, including employees and unions who have 
been denied workplace fairness, consumers wronged by noxious products, 
and minorities claiming denials of their fundamental civil rights.174 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See, e.g., Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (explaining that “[a]llowing the defendants here to ‘pick 
off’ a representative plaintiff with an offer of judgment less than two months after the complaint is 
filed may undercut the viability of the class action procedure, and frustrate the objectives of this 
procedural mechanism for aggregating small claims”). 
 168 See BANNON, supra note 122, at 1 (explaining the alarming vacancy rates in federal dis-
trict courts); BLOTKY & BATHIJA, supra note 122, at 1 (declaring that two thirds of Americans 
live in judicial districts with so many vacancies that it is considered a federal judicial emergency); 
ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 4–10 (discussing how the federal courts have focused on reducing 
costs). 
 169 See ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 4–9 (detailing how the Judiciary has focused on reducing 
rent, information technology, and personnel expenses). Chief Justice Roberts points out that the 
Judiciary received an appropriation of $6.97 billion out of a total federal budget of $3.7 trillion, or 
approximately two tenths of a percent of the budget. Id. at 3–4. 
 170 BANNON supra note 122, at 1. 
 171 BLOTKY & BATHIJA, supra note 122, at 1. The nonpartisan Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts makes that determination and defines a judicial emergency as “a circuit court 
vacancy and adjusted case filings greater than 700, or an eighteen-month vacancy and filings be-
tween 500 and 700; or a district court vacancy with filings greater than 600, an eighteen-month 
vacancy where weighted filings are between 430 and 600, or any court with more than one judge-
ship and only one active judge” Id. 
 172 BANNON, supra note 122, at 1. Out of 677 judgeships, there have been more than sixty 
vacancies during the entire Obama administration. Id. This leaves judges—already burdened with 
heavy caseloads—with an insurmountable amount of work. Id. 
 173 See id.; ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 9. This concern led Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Roberts to call on the Executive and Legislative branches to “act diligently in nominating 
and confirming” judges to fill vacancies. ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 9–10. 
 174 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. The majority of class actions that are filed in federal 
court are “securities, antitrust, labor and employment, consumer, employee benefits, and civil 
rights.” Id. 
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The judiciary is not the only system strapped for cash during the cur-
rent economic downturn.175 The federal government, also feeling the ripple 
effects from the tightening of budgets, needs the cost-saving benefits that 
collective litigation provides. 176 Recent cuts in the federal government’s 
budget have detrimentally impacted law enforcement agencies, such as the 
U.S. Departments of Justice and Labor, thus preventing them from effectu-
ating their responsibilities of enforcing critical statutes. 177 Compensating 
harmed plaintiffs through collective action, however, “provide[s] an im-
portant private supplement to public enforcement of social norms.”178 Pub-
lic agencies with enforcement power still need private litigation to ensure 
compliance.179 Collective action enlists private sector attorneys as private 
attorneys general to enforce rights that the government often cannot prose-
cute, which is especially necessary in light of reduced federal budgets.180 
Litigating similar cases individually rather than collectively wastes ju-
dicial and federal resources at a time when the government can least afford 
to do so.181 When one plaintiff represents all similarly situated plaintiffs, 
costs are reduced for the parties involved and the court system.182 Courts, 
for instance, only have to spend resources on one case, thus reducing case-
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Pete Yost, Eric Holder Delaying Justice Department Furlough Decisions Until Mid-
April, POLITICO (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/justice-department-
furlough-decision-delayed-089441 [perma.cc/HLQ3-6HG7] (reporting how the justice department 
dealt with a budget cut of millions of dollars); Josh Hicks, Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion Faces Furloughs if Sequester Continues, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/03/21/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-
faces-furloughs-if-sequester-continues [perma.cc/6QPC-MX9J]; Stephen Losey, Labor Dept. Em-
ployees Get Furlough Notices, FEDERAL TIMES (Mar. 8, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.federaltimes.
com/article/20130308/AGENCY01/303080002/Labor-Dept-employees-get-furlough-notices?odyssey
=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE [perma.cc/P7MR-4QW3]; ROBERTS supra note 122, at 4–10. 
 176 See Yost, supra note 175; Hicks, supra note 175; Losey, supra note 175; ROBERTS, supra 
note 122, at 4–10. 
 177 See Yost, supra note 175 (detailing measures that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder took 
to manage $1.6 billion dollar cut in Department of Justice funding); Hicks, supra note 175 (de-
scribing the potential furloughs that the EEOC faced as a result of a five percent budget cut, in-
cluding the backlog of workplace discrimination cases, expected to grow by almost forty percent); 
Losey, supra note 175 (describing that the Department of Labor furloughed 4700 employees, or 
twenty-eight percent of its workforce, as a result of the 2013 federal budget cuts). 
 178 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 179 Id. “When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would 
prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of 
securing broad compliance with the law.” Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 
U.S. 400, 401 (1968)). 
 180 Id. § 1:8 (discussing how private sector attorneys often enforce rights that the public sector 
has the ability to enforce); see Yost, supra note 175; Hicks, supra note 175; Losey, supra note 
175. 
 181 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §1:9; BANNON, supra note 122, at 1; BLOTKY & BATHIJA, 
supra note 122, at 1; ROBERTS supra note 122, at 4–10. 
 182 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. 
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loads.183 Additionally, plaintiffs share the cost of bringing the suit, allowing 
absent class members to avoid being financially or physically involved.184 
Defendants only have to defend one case, and all parties avoid the risk of 
inconsistent results that may occur when similarly situated plaintiffs bring 
identical claims.185 As follows, allowing defendants to undercut collective 
action by mooting cases prior to class certification eliminates the increased 
efficiency collective action provides; mooting the proposed representative’s 
claim would allow plaintiffs to re-file collective actions only if they are able 
to find a new class representative, wasting the resources of all parties in-
volved.186 Because the damages involved in individual claims are relatively 
small, the burden of this unnecessary litigation would fall almost exclusive-
ly on federal district courts, which are already severely overworked.187 
Increased efficiency also leads to greater justice, which is especially 
needed in these modern times of reduced federal budgets.188 From an eco-
nomic perspective, collective actions permit plaintiffs “to pool claims which 
would be uneconomical to litigate individually,” allowing those alleging 
small amounts of monetary damages to overcome the cost of litigation.189 In 
addition, accepting these cases collectively rather than individually provides 
the court with the capacity to administer justice to more plaintiffs at once in 
a more timely fashion.190 If these cases were mooted prior to class certifica-
tion, these claims would have to be dealt with individually, delaying justice 
for plaintiffs in need.191 Individual cases would be the better of two bad op-
tions; the worse and more likely option would be leaving those turning to 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See id. 
 184 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). “An absent class-action 
plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course 
. . . .” Id.; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. 
 185 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. 
 186 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1535 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 187 See, e.g., Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (majority opinion) (stating that the proposed repre-
sentative’s individual claim in a collective FLSA case was only worth about $7500); Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 472 U.S. at 809 (class action in federal court concerned a gas company’s failure to pay 
investors royalties, with each claim worth $100); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161 (class action in federal court 
where each individual’s damages were only $70); see also BANNON, supra note 122, at 1. Large 
class actions that lack a federal question often get brought into federal court using supplemental ju-
risdiction where there are more than 100 class members or more than $5 million in damages. See 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 6:12. 
 188 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809; RUBENSTEIN, 
supra note 8, § 1:7; Yost, supra note 175; Hicks, supra note 175; Losey, supra note 175; ROB-
ERTS, supra note 122, at 4–10. 
 189 Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:7. 
 190 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 809; ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 4–10. 
 191 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1535 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 
U.S. at 809; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:7; ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 4–10. 
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federal courts for justice uncompensated as “economic reality” forces many 
suits to be collective or not brought at all.192 
Mooting collective actions also eliminates the benefits of deterrence 
because it significantly reduces the financial incentive to sue.193 Collective 
action deters bad acts because it incentivizes suits against bad actors that 
harm many, regardless of whether each individual recovery would be 
enough to justify a suit.194 This inherently reduces the burden on public of-
ficials charged with enforcement, an especially worthy goal considering the 
current slimmed-down government budgets and bloated federal debt. 195 
Moreover, deterrence adds to the overall efficiency of the court system.196 If 
bad actors are deterred from committing bad acts, no actual harm would 
occur and litigation would therefore be unnecessary.197 Mooting the pro-
posed representative’s claims, however, would eliminate this deterrent ef-
fect of collective litigation.198 
Additionally, mooting a claim abuses the legitimacy of the legal system 
by infringing upon the rights of absent members and creating inconsistent 
results among similarly situated plaintiffs who are forced to litigate separate-
ly.199 If many similar claims are litigated individually, yet garner conflicting 
results, it weakens the notion of uniform justice.200 Also, mooting a repre-
sentative’s case forces class members to choose between litigating individual-
ly—and thus running up against unpredictable results, or not moving forward 
with litigation—and thus forgoing any potential recovery.201 
D. Mooting Collective Litigation and the Compromise of Social Justice 
The mooting of collective litigation with unaccepted settlement offers 
negatively impacts marginalized groups such as low-income workers and 
consumers who lack the financial resources necessary to successfully liti-
                                                                                                                           
 192 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161. 
 193 See id.; Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (stating that mooting actions with an unaccepted settlement 
offer frustrates the objectives of collective litigation); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 194 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8. 
 195 See id.; ROBERTS, supra note 122, at 4–10. The sheer increase of enforcers, both public 
and private, allows for innovation and more protective litigation. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:8 
(citing Thompson, supra note 86, at 206). 
 196 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. “The deterrent effect of the small-claims class ac-
tion preserves public enforcement and judicial resources as it obviates the need for future en-
forcement proceedings.” Id. 
 197 See id. 
 198 See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. 
 199 See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. 
 200 See Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 390 (“A fundamental aspect of justice is parity of treatment. 
Persons similarly situated and aggrieved should be similarly treated.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 
8, § 1:10. 
 201 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161; Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:10. 
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gate a costly lawsuit against a powerful corporation.202 Considering the ma-
jor role that collective action has played in activist organizations, this prac-
tice impairs organizations that are fighting for justice, such as those focused 
on racial equality or environmental justice.203 
The current practice of mooting claims prior to a class certification 
motion has already produced negative repercussions for marginalized 
groups, from workers being denied minimally required compensation to 
consumers demanding compensation after being misled and mistreated by a 
national insurance company.204 Several recent cases demonstrate these re-
percussions.205 In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, discussed in the 
Introduction of this Note, workers attempted to recoup federally-mandated 
minimum compensation for completed work that their employer did not 
pay.206 The proposed representative’s claim was mooted, and none of the 
thousands of workers who would potentially have been in the class received 
compensation, including the representative who failed to accept the offered 
relief.207 
A comparable story of pre-class certification mooting and dismissal 
occurred in McCauley v. Trans Union, a suit against a credit-reporting agen-
cy that allegedly violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by negligently indi-
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (holding moot the plaintiff’s claim in collective litiga-
tion attempting to enforce hospital employees’ FLSA rights); Diaz, 732 F.3d at 949–55 (address-
ing consumer that was contesting the mooting of her collective fraud case against an insurance 
company); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 572 (holding that McDonald’s workers’ collective FLSA claim 
was mooted by an unaccepted settlement offer for the proposed representative); McCauley v. 
Trans Union, 402 F.3d 340, 340–42 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding moot a case brought by consumers 
that were harmed by a negligent consumer reporting agency). 
 203 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2013) (collective suit against 
those responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that caused millions of barrels of oil to spill 
into the Gulf of Mexico); Dorrian, supra note 104 (discussing a NAACP suit combating work-
place discrimination); YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 244−45. 
 204 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527 (mooting a proposed collective FLSA case on behalf of 
hospital workers seeking minimum compensation with an unaccepted settlement offer); Diaz, 732 
F.3d at 949–55 (overturning the granting of a mooting motion in consumers’ class action against 
an insurance company that provided poor service); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 572 (mooting McDon-
ald’s worker’s proposed collective FLSA case with an unaccepted settlement offer for the pro-
posed representative); McCauley, 402 F.3d at 340−42 (mooting a proposed collective litigation 
case brought by consumers against a negligent credit reporting agency when the proposed repre-
sentative received a settlement offer for complete recovery). 
 205 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527; Diaz, 732 F.3d at 949–55; O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 572; 
McCauley, 402 F.3d at 340–42. 
 206 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. Like many proposed representatives, the workers in 
Genesis could not determine the number of workers who could belong to the class because of the 
lack of discovery, but the number was likely several thousand. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 6. 
 207 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1527, 1532. Genesis was not the only employer that attempt-
ed to use unaccepted offers to moot their employees’ collective FLSA claim. See O’Brien, 575 
F.3d at 572 (mooting FLSA action brought by McDonald’s employees due to unaccepted settle-
ment offer). 
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cating false liens on consumers’ credit reports, leading class members to be 
forced to pay additional and inappropriate fees. 208 Finally, Diaz v. First 
American Home Buyers Protection Corp. involved a consumer who sued 
her insurance company on behalf of herself and potentially hundreds of 
thousands of other policyholders in response to the company’s practice of 
refusing to make timely repairs, using substandard contractors, and wrong-
fully denying legitimate claims.209 The U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California dismissed the collective suit after the initial consumer 
who filed suit refused to accept an individual offer for complete recovery.210 
The only way she could continue pursuing recovery for the class would be 
if an appeals court rejected the mooting of the class representative’s 
claim.211 
The threat of having a proposed representative’s claim, and therefore 
the whole class action, mooted looms over groups that use collective litiga-
tion to fight for justice. 212 Collective litigation has long been a tool for 
change and organization for advocates promoting racial equality and envi-
ronmental justice.213 This strategy continues today.214 Mooting permits de-
fendants to avoid paying damages for everything from workplace discrimi-
nation to massive oil spills, leaving victims uncompensated and bad actors 
undeterred from committing further unjust acts.215 
III. ATTAINABLE FIXES THAT WILL PRESERVE COLLECTIVE LITIGATION AS 
AN AVENUE FOR JUSTICE 
Justice requires that courts avoid the unilateral mooting of collective 
actions.216 The Supreme Court has the ability and had the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See McCauley, 402 F.3d at 340–42. Trans Union had negligently and falsely indicated on 
the plaintiff’s credit report that he had outstanding tax liens. Id. at 340. This prevented the plaintiff 
from securing a student loan. Id. He demanded $240, which was the amount of the fee he had to 
pay when he used his credit card to pay his $8000 tuition. Id. at 340–41. 
 209 See Diaz, 732 F.3d at 949; Complaint at 2, Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 
732 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 3:09-cv-00775). 
 210 Diaz, 732 F.3d at 950–51. 
 211 See id. at 953–55. 
 212 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d at 329 (collective suit against massive polluters 
responsible for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill requesting tremendous damages that would likely 
be reduced if litigated individually); Dorrian, supra note 104 (discussing NAACP collective suit 
contesting workplace discrimination that would be more difficult to prove if litigated individual-
ly); YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 244–45. 
 213 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 244–45 (detailing how collective litigation is part of the 
strategy for civil rights and environmental groups to achieve change). 
 214 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d at 329; Dorrian, supra note 104. 
 215 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk (Genesis III), 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1533–35 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 
2013) (evidencing that a majority of courts decide that an unaccepted offer can moot a claim); 
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remedy this problem.217 The Court, however, chose not to invalidate this 
application of the mootness doctrine, making a judicial solution to this judi-
cial problem unlikely.218 
Another resolution, however, may be reached by amending the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) to clearly limit the power of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 68 settlement offers and to revise 
the role that FRCP 68 plays in the settlement process.219 Some have criti-
cized the role that FRCP 68 has played in the settlement process.220 To limit 
the rule’s power, several district courts have taken different approaches, but 
each of these approaches has its own shortcomings.221 The problem goes 
beyond what district courts can do: its solution requires fixing FRCP 68.222 
The change needed to be made to FRCP 68 in order to properly effec-
tuate the policy goals of collective litigation is simple; the process of im-
plementing the change, however, is far more difficult.223 Amending FRCP 
                                                                                                                           
Weiss v. Regal Collection, 385 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004) (mooting collective cases with unac-
cepted offers frustrates the objectives of collective litigation). 
 217 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1534–35 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (illustrating that the issue of 
unilateral mooting of collective actions is “part and parcel of . . . the question Genesis presented 
for our review” yet the court does not resolve the issue). 
 218 See id. 
 219 See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 68; Gene-
sis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1535–37 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the role that FRCP 68 plays in the 
mooting of claims); see also How the Rulemaking Process Works: Overview for the Bench, Bar, and 
Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rule
making-process-works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx#summary-procedures [perma.cc/H3XZ-V5NF] 
(discussing in depth the process of amending the FRCP). 
 220 See Jack Starcher, Note, Addressing What Isn’t There: How District Courts Manage the 
Threat of Rule 68’s Cost-Shifting Provision in the Context of Class Actions, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
129, 130–31 (2014) (discussing how the conflict between FRCP 23 and 68 leads to the problem of 
picking off proposed class representatives with unaccepted settlement offers); Brandon T. 
McDonough, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Peek-A-Boo: The Confusing State of Rule 68, 70 BENCH 
& B. MINN. 19, 19 (2013) (“One does not need to dig too deep to discover that Rule 68 is not 
working for federal court litigation. The question is whether Rule 68 can be fixed. The answer is, 
probably not.”). 
 221 See Starcher, supra note 220, at 143–65. Starcher discusses the different approaches that 
district courts have taken to avoid picking off proposed class representatives with unaccepted 
offers: granting a motion to strike, refusing to strike the offer but declaring the offer to be without 
legal meaning, or refusing to take any action whatsoever. See id. at 143–57. He instead advocates 
for a fourth approach, as adopted in Mey v. Monitronics International: let the case proceed 
through class certification, and, if it survives, the offer will “disappear.” Id. at 161 (quoting Mey v. 
Monitronics Int’l, No. 5:11CV90, 2012 WL 983766 at *5 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 22, 2012)). If the 
case does not proceed to certification, the plaintiff is held to the requirements of FRCP 68(d), 
which requires offerees who obtain judgments that are more favorable than an unaccepted settle-
ment offer to pay costs incurred after the offer. Id. He also recognizes that all approaches have 
flaws, including the one for which he advocates. Id. at 159 (“Each of these approaches leaves 
something to be desired.”). 
 222 See McDonough, supra note 220, at 19. 
 223 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077; see also U.S. COURTS, supra note 219. 
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68 can be done through one of two ways: (1) the traditional, but laborious, 
rulemaking process, which falls under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, or, 
(2) through legislative action.224 Considering the Supreme Court’s failure to 
resolve the issue when it was presented in 2013, bypassing the courts and 
utilizing congressional action seems enticing. 225  The current gridlock in 
Congress has resulted in a significant slowdown in legislative action.226 
Nevertheless, the coalition of parties that would potentially benefit from 
this change, from environmentalists to small government conservatives, 
makes it both politically and legally attractive.227 
A. An Unlikely Solution: The Supreme Court Favorably Resolves the Split 
An easy remedy to the issue of mooting cases in collective litigation 
could emerge if the Supreme Court decides a case addressing the specific 
issue and ends, once and for all, the practice of unilateral mooting of collec-
tive cases with unaccepted settlement offers.228 Considering, however, that 
the Court had this chance in 2013 with Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk and decided to ignore the issue and publish a decision irrelevant to 
the issue of mooting, the Court is unlikely to come to a favorable resolution 
in the near future.229 
The majority of the Court in Genesis did not decide the issue of moot-
ing on its merits and instead held that the question was improperly brought 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012); see also U.S. COURTS, supra note 219; infra Part III-
B-1 (discussing the formal process for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 225 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1534−35 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the issue of 
unilateral mooting of collective actions is “part and parcel of . . . the question Genesis presented 
for our review” yet the court does not resolve the issue). 
 226 See, e.g., Philip Bump, It’s a Holiday Miracle! The 113th Congress (Probably) Wasn’t the 
Least Productive Ever!, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/12/19/its-a-holiday-miracle-the-113th-probably-wasnt-the-least-
productive-ever [perma.cc/JQN6-E4AY]. The 113th Congress passed the second fewest amount of 
legislation, excluding the naming of post offices, in history. Id. The only session that was less 
productive was the 112th Congress. Id. 
 227 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1533–35 (Kagan, J., dissenting); REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVEN-
TION, WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 13, 18, 27 (2012), https://www.
gop.com/platform/ [perma.cc/NQX3-NG6W] [hereinafter GOP PLATFORM]; DEMOCRATIC NAT’L 
COMM., MOVING AMERICA FORWARD: 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM 9, 17, 20–21 
(2012), https://www.democrats.org/party-platform [perma.cc/6BGE-VDD6 ] [hereinafter DEM PLAT-
FORM] (highlighting policy achievements and goals that are important to groups that often use collec-
tive litigation, such as environmentalists, civil rights groups, and unions); Amanda Little, An Inter-
view with Ron Paul About His Presidential Platform on Energy and the Environment, GRIST (Oct. 
17, 2007), http://grist.org/article/paul1 [perma.cc/PUF6-3J3S] (discussing how class actions are used 
to enforce private property rights); YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 244. 
 228 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1528–29 (acknowledging the split among the circuits regard-
ing the mooting of claims with unaccepted offers but refusing to resolve the split in specific case 
“because the issue is not properly before” the court); 1537 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 229 See id. at 1534–35 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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before it.230 The majority believed that the plaintiff, Symczyk, conceded the 
mooting of her individual claim in her brief to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.231 Supreme Court Justice Kagan, dissenting with the support of 
three of her colleagues, however, disagreed and passionately advocated 
against the unilateral mooting of collective cases with a settlement offer.232 
Genesis’s focus on the singular issue of whether an unaccepted settlement 
offer may moot a case was reinforced in oral argument, during which all 
three lawyers who argued the case—the U.S. Solicitor General and lawyers 
representing both Genesis and Symczyk—discussed an unaccepted settle-
ment offer’s ability to moot a claim.233 Yet the choice of five members of 
the Court makes it unlikely that the Court in its current makeup will grant 
certiorari to hear a similar case in upcoming terms with the intention of re-
solving this issue.234 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See id. at 1528−29 (majority opinion). Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, declared 
that the split was “not properly before [the Court].” Id. 
 231 See id. This is despite the fact that Symczyk explicitly asked whether an unaccepted offer 
for a proposed representative should moot an FLSA collective action. See Brief for Appellant at 2, 
Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013) 
(No. 10-3178), 2010 WL 4163160, at *2. 
 232 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1532−37 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“An unaccepted settlement 
offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, with no operative effect.”). Justices 
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined Justice Kagan’s dissent. Id. at 1532. 
 233 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 133 S. Ct. 
1523 (2014) (No. 11-1059). Ronald Mann, representing Genesis, stated that “if the person won’t 
take yes for an answer, the Federal Court doesn’t need anything further.” Id. at 9−10. Neal Kumar 
Katyal, representing Symczyk, stated that the case is about “the question of whether a withdrawn 
Rule 68 offer could moot a case. It cannot . . . it is literally the question presented.” Id. at 16 (As-
sistant to the Solicitor General Anthony A. Yang, for the United State as amicus curiae supporting 
Symczyk, stated that “[a] settlement offer does not moot a claim if it is not accepted”). The briefs 
for each of the parties reaffirmed the issue as well. See Brief for Respondent at i, Symczyk v. 
Genesis HealthCare Corp., 133 S. Ct. 26 (2014) (No. 11-1059) (“The question presented is: Did 
defendants’ Rule 68 offer to Ms. Symczyk render the entire collective action moot . . . ?”); Peti-
tioner for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 133 S. Ct. 26 (2014) 
(No. 11-1059) (stating the “question presented” as “[w]hether a case becomes moot, and thus 
beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defend-
ants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondent at i, Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 133 S. Ct. 26 (2014) (No. 11-1059) 
(stating the “question presented” as “[w]hether an action brought as a collective action under 29 
U.S.C. 216(b) becomes moot when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satis-
fy all of the plaintiff’s individual damage claims”). 
 234 Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1537 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito all joined Justice Thomas’s majority opinion. See id. at 1526 (majority 
opinion). 
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B. A Simple Solution with a Complex Path: Amending the Federal  
Rules of Civil Procedure 
The simpler solution to the problematic approach of mooting collective 
cases with unaccepted settlement offers is a relatively straightforward 
amendment to FRCP 68.235 FRCP 68 covers offers of judgment.236 The rule 
includes a subsection concerning unaccepted offers, but it does not mention 
mootness at all.237 
Courts that favor mooting have used FRCP 68 offers to show that the 
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction for a plaintiff’s case.238 These courts 
consider this offer to determine whether there is a “justifiable case or con-
troversy under Article III.”239 Explicitly detailing an unaccepted settlement 
offer’s role in mooting cases in the rule could resolve this problem. 240 
Amending FRCP 68(b) to allow FRCP 68 offers to be used for mooting cas-
es only when the moving party has no good faith belief that the opposing 
party intends for the litigation to be collective will prevent courts from 
mooting collective cases with unaccepted settlement offers.241 
Even though the language necessary for the FRCP amendment is sim-
ple, the process of amending a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is far more 
complex.242 The traditional rulemaking process takes a significant amount 
of time, and this specific amendment is unlikely to succeed in part because 
the Supreme Court must approve amendments to the Federal Rules.243 A 
FRCP amendment may avoid Supreme Court review, however, if Congress 
amends the rule through the legislative process.244 Congress has not passed 
much legislation recently, but considering the coalitions that could poten-
                                                                                                                           
 235 See FED. R. CIV. P. 68; Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
FRCP 68’s role in the problematic approach of mooting collective cases). 
 236 FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 237 Id. at R. 68(b). FRCP 68(b) reads: “An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it 
does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a pro-
ceeding to determine costs.” Id. 
 238 See O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A] Rule 68 
offer can be used to show that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Greisz v. House-
hold Bank, 176 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 239 Id. 
 240 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting FRCP 68’s silence re-
garding allowing courts to “terminate a lawsuit without the plaintiff’s consent” yet courts still do 
so if “only the plaintiff’s obstinacy or madness prevents her from accepting total victory”); 
O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 574. 
 241 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536 (Kagan, J., dissenting); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 574. 
 242 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071−2077 (2012); see also U.S. COURTS, supra note 219. 
 243 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074−2077 (detailing how the Supreme Court has the authority to 
prescribe federal rules and must transmit proposed amendments to Congress); U.S. COURTS, supra 
note 219 (stating that successful amendments to the FRCP require Supreme Court approval). 
 244 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (all court-made rules such as the Federal Rules must be consistent 
with legislative acts). 
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tially support ending the practice of mooting proposed class representatives’ 
claims, the amendment may be the type of political winner that Congress 
could support.245 
1. Path One: The Traditional Rulemaking Process is Unlikely to Succeed 
A change to the Federal Rules could be accomplished through the tra-
ditional rulemaking process.246 The lengthy procedure requires a minimum 
of seven stages of formal comment and review, lasting usually two to three 
years total for suggestions to be properly implemented into the rules.247 A 
suggestion for a rule change goes through several advisory committees as-
sisting the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference, which is made up of federal judges, practicing lawyers, law 
professors, state supreme court chief justices, and representatives from the 
federal Department of Justice.248 Suggestions must also go through several 
public hearings and a comment period, and they require approval from both 
the Supreme Court and Congress.249 
The Judicial Conference is statutorily required to “continuous[ly] 
study the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and proce-
dure.”250 Pursuant to this requirement, the Judicial Conference must focus 
on several factors, including fairness in administration, just determination 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See id.; Bump, supra note 226; GOP PLATFORM, supra note 227, at 27 (advocating for the 
necessity of enforcing private property rights); DEM PLATFORM, supra note 227, at 9, 17, 20−21 
(highlighting policy achievements and goals important to groups that use collective action to 
achieve their goals, such as environmentalists, civil rights groups, and unions); Little, supra note 
227 (Republican leader discussing that class actions enforce private property rights); YEAZELL, 
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productive was the 112th Congress. Bump, supra note 226. 
 246 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074−2077; U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 1−6 (discussing the 
procedure for how the Federal Rules are amended). 
 247 U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 2. Anyone may make a suggestion for an amendment to 
the rules. See id. 
 248 See id. at 3−4. The authority for the Judicial Conference and its Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and the procedure for promulgating federal civil procedure rules were 
created by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 1; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071−2077. The Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure is often referred to as the Standing Committee. U.S. 
COURTS, supra note 219, at 1. The Standing Committee coordinates proposed amendments “as 
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COURTS, supra note 219, at 1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b)). 
 249 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 2−6. The Supreme Court has the authority to pre-
scribe the federal rules during a statutorily required waiting period. See id. at 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2072, 2075). Congress is the final step in the process and has seven months to act before rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court automatically take effect. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2074−75). 
 250 Id. at 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008). 
2016] The Concerning Practice That Effectively Ends Collective Litigation 123 
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. 251 
There have been a number of amendments since the original rules were 
written in 1937.252 Amendments have been issued even during the modern 
era of hyper-partisanship.253 
The proposed change to FRCP 68 that would lead to the elimination of 
unilateral mooting of collective action before a class certification motion is 
aligned with the Judicial Conference’s congressionally-required considera-
tions.254 Binding all class members to the same result, positive or adverse, 
helps ensure fair administration of justice.255 Thus, picking off a class repre-
sentative with an offer for full recovery and forcing every class member to 
bring his or her own individual suit is not just determination of litigation.256 
If every potential class member were forced to bring each case individually, 
this would create significant unjustifiable expense and a delay in justice for 
each member of the class, the defendant, and any party looking to the court 
for resolution of a dispute.257 
The proposed change to the Federal Rules may accomplish what Con-
gress desired of the Judicial Conference, but because the procedure requires 
the Supreme Court’s approval, any amendment favoring the elimination of 
                                                                                                                           
 251 28 U.S.C. § 331; see U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 1. Other factors include simplicity 
of procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 331; see U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 1. 
 252 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Historical Note, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL 
INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp#Form_6_1_target [perma.cc/N8JL-558G]. 
 253 See id.; Bump, supra note 226. The FRCP have been amended eight times since the 
Obama Administration began. See CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 252. 
 254 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (detailing the congressionally desired goals for the FRCP and Judicial 
Conference); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, §§ 1:7–10 (detailing the policy benefits of class actions 
as efficiency, compensation, deterrence, and legitimacy). 
 255 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (desiring changes in FRCP to increase “fairness in administration”); 
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (“Allowing the defendants here to ‘pick off’ a representative plaintiff with 
an offer of judgment less than two months after the complaint is filed may undercut the viability 
of the class action procedure and frustrate the objectives of this procedural mechanism for aggre-
gating small claims.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:3 (stating that FRCP 23 allows for class 
actions specifically in cases in which the defendant has limited funds in order to ensure that all 
class members can receive at least partial recovery). Various collective actions have different 
procedures for determining who can be bound by the result of a collective litigation. Compare 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (stating that class actions bind all members of the class), with 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b) (stating that collective FLSA claims do not bind similarly situated workers who do not 
opt into the class). 
 256 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (desiring changes in the Federal Rules to increase “just determination 
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay”); Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9 (detailing how collective actions increase efficiency through 
consolidation of similar claims, saving costs for all litigants, absent class members, and especially 
courts, as a single class action is a much easier process than a number of individual claims; dis-
cussing how collective actions prevent problematic inconsistent results that may arise when simi-
lar cases are handled separately). 
 257 See 28 U.S.C. § 331; Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344; RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 1:9. 
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the mooting doctrine is likely to face opposition from the Justices.258 As 
noted above, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to end this practice in 
Genesis.259 The majority’s decision to avoid resolving the issue shows that 
at least five members of the Court do not want to address the mooting doc-
trine at this time, making it unlikely that the Court in its current makeup 
would approve an amendment similar to the one suggested herein.260 
2. Path Two: Congressional Action: Potentially Difficult but Politically 
Attractive 
Congress has the power to amend the FRCP unilaterally through the 
legislative process.261 Any potential change to a law is made more promis-
ing by the coalitions of parties and interest groups likely willing to lobby 
for and support its passage.262 The previously suggested amendment to the 
Federal Rules could garner support from powerful groups within both major 
political parties, making it politically attractive.263 
Although some critics of legislative action regarding court rules prefer 
that judges and practicing attorneys exclusively manage the rulemaking 
process for the Federal Rules because they inherently have more legal ex-
pertise, the Federal Rules have been and continue to be influenced by the 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court’s role in approving amend-
ments to the FRCP); Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536−37 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for having the opportunity to resolve the circuit split to end the practice of mooting col-
lective actions with unaccepted settlement offers, but choosing to do something that “aids no one, 
now or ever”); U.S. COURTS, supra note 219, at 5. 
 259 See Genesis III, 133 S. Ct. at 1536−37 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 260 See id. 
 261 See SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 7 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 262 See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: 
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 284–87 (1987) (detailing 
how a strange coalition of Republicans, Democrats, and interest groups came together to pass major 
tax reform in 1986); Press Release, U.S. Senate Democrats, Public Interest Groups Voice Support for 
Senate Health Insurance Proposal, Continuing Momentum for Reform (Nov. 20, 2009), http://
democrats.senate.gov/2009/11/20/public-interest-groups-voice-support-for-senate-health-insurance-
proposal-continuing-momentum-for-reform/#.VOOhwVPF9DU [perma.cc/2N47-TQ8C] (showing 
the numerous and various interest groups supporting health care reform in 2009, including the Amer-
ican Association for Retired Persons, NAACP, Health Care for America Now, Service Employees 
International Union, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Center 
for Budget and Policy Priorities, National Women’s Law Center, and Doctors for America). 
 263 See YEAZELL, supra note 22, at 244; Little, supra note 227 (Republican presidential can-
didate and ideological leader discussing how class actions effectively enforce private property 
rights); GOP PLATFORM, supra note 227, at 27 (Republican platform advocating the necessity of 
enforcing private property rights); DEM PLATFORM, supra note 227, at 9, 17, 20–21 (highlighting 
policy goals important to groups that use collective actions to achieve their goals such as envi-
ronmentalists, civil rights groups, and unions). 
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political current of the day. 264 Unfortunately, the recent political climate 
shows Congress’s inertia is resting on inaction rather than massive policy 
changes.265 Legislative unproductivity is a result of a variety of factors.266 
Regardless of the reason, few believe Congress will be significantly more 
productive in the foreseeable future.267 
Legislative change generally requires a coalition of party actors and in-
terest groups willing to lobby for and support its passage.268 The suggested 
amendment to FRCP 68 could garner support from powerful groups within 
both major political parties, making it politically attractive.269 Although the 
passage of any bill remains an uphill battle in the modern political culture, 
the groups benefitting from the existence of, and supporting the use of, col-
lective actions play a key role within both major political parties, making 
the FRCP 68 amendment potentially a political winner.270 
Interest groups critical to the Democratic Party’s success greatly bene-
fit from collective action suits.271 Environmentalists, civil rights activists, 
and workers’ rights advocates, including unions, have all played a signifi-
cant role in the success of the modern Democratic Party.272 The importance 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 261, at 317−18 (detailing how politics has affected civil pro-
cedure from the Common Law and the Field Code to the modern day); Laurens Walker, A Compre-
hensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 459−60 (1993). 
 265 See, e.g., Charles Babington, Why Congress Is So Dysfunctional, HUFFPOST POLITICS, 
(Oct. 2, 2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/02/congress-dysfunction-long_
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 267 See Chris Cillizza & Paul Kane, Think the 113th Congress Was Bad? Just Wait, WASH. 
POST: THE FIX (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/09/25/
think-the-113th-congress-was-bad-just-wait [perma.cc/5VZM-3F2J] (describing how the 114th 
Congress will be just as unproductive as the 113th, if not less productive, partially because of the 
constant focus on the next election). 
 268 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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of these groups is so critical to the Democratic Party that the party has ce-
mented many of these groups’ core issues within the party platform.273 En-
vironmentalists, civil rights advocates, and workers’ rights advocates all 
benefit from collective action by litigating massive suits against various bad 
actors such as polluters and employers violating federal law.274 The mooting 
of class representatives’ claims in collective litigation has already weakened 
these groups’ efforts to promote justice, making these groups and their con-
gressional Democratic allies more likely to support the FRCP amend-
ment.275 
The suggested Federal Rules amendment is also philosophically con-
sistent with the modern Republican ideology.276 In recent years, the Repub-
lican Party has concentrated on reducing government spending and mini-
mizing intrusion into individuals’ lives.277 With this more libertarian tilt, the 
Republican Party has achieved budget cuts in almost every area of govern-
ment, including law enforcement.278 This has included efforts to eliminate 
the government from the private intricacies of individuals’ lives as much as 
possible, even in areas typically deemed appropriate for government inter-
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vention.279 At the same time, Republicans have strong convictions regarding 
private property rights, ingraining them into their party platform.280 Even 
the most strident libertarians, who tolerate only minimal government inter-
vention, recognize the need for courts to protect these property rights.281 For 
the modern Republican Party that advocates for protecting property rights, 
it logically flows to simultaneously uphold and support collective actions, 
which allow citizens to more effectively enforce property rights. 282 This 
property right enforcement is also accomplished in a Republican-friendly 
and cost effective manner by relying on a private attorney general rather 
than a governmental agency to ensure the rights are protected.283 
Notwithstanding the fact that correcting this issue of application of the 
mooting doctrine is aligned with the philosophies and interests of both par-
ties, the implementation of this recommended solution, however, still faces 
an uphill battle.284 Congress often struggles to resolve major issues, choos-
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ing bandages when legislative surgery is needed, even when deadlines with 
significant consequences are looming. 285 The biggest roadblocks for this 
solution are the parties that benefit from maintaining the mooting of collec-
tive actions, including wealthy corporate defendants facing repeated law-
suits.286 With the power of money in politics at an all-time high, yet concen-
trated in only a few hands, the wealthy may have the spending ability to 
prevent any reform that may save collective litigation, even if the reform is 
popular within both parties. 287  Without collective action, many of the 
wrongs wealthy corporate defendants commit, from blatantly illegal dis-
crimination to world-altering oil spills, will go inadequately punished and 
the victims will go uncompensated.288 
CONCLUSION 
“Corporate profits are at their highest level in at least 85 years. Em-
ployee compensation is at the lowest level in 65 years.”289 An April 2014 
New York Times article led with this quote and continued by describing how 
corporate profits have increased over the past decades at the expense of the 
corporate tax rate and employee compensation rate, both of which fell sig-
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nificantly.290 Highlighting a variety of data, the article demonstrated how 
the powerful in Washington, D.C. have effectively served corporate inter-
ests and glossed over the concerns of middle class America. Unfortunately, 
this is not a new trend. 
The issue of mooting a class representative’s claim with an unaccepted 
offer prior to a class certification motion may be another example of corpo-
rate interests triumphing over those of individual Americans. Historically, 
collective actions have served as a method for individuals to band together 
to create an even playing field against a strong, unified corporate defendant. 
The proliferation of the practice of mooting cases strikes at this equalizing 
tool and allows the powerful to succeed without merit. Beyond the tremen-
dous societal benefits, there are significant political benefits in making the 
suggested change to the application of the mootness doctrine. Undercutting 
collective action leaves victims uncompensated and corporate wrongdoers 
enriched. This should not continue. 
There are several paths to avoid this danger. The Supreme Court could 
decide a case that brings this question in front of the Court in a manner that 
satisfies the conservative wing of the court, but after the Court’s refusal to 
do so in Genesis, there is no reason to think a majority would address the 
issue. A proposed amendment to the FRCP could pass through the tradition-
al rulemaking process that includes the Supreme Court’s input, making that 
route for this change murkier than the usual proposed amendment. The final 
option for this fix relies on Congress. Given the various coalitions that lead 
Congress to action or inaction, this path has some hope of success. When 
considering the influence that wealthy interests have in shaping our legal 
system, however, this issue may be another pawn lost in the game of justice. 
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